Riverlake Residents Association, Nova Scotia Municipal Board, 1985 by Kaiser, H. Archibald
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 9 Issue 3 Article 8 
12-1-1985 
Riverlake Residents Association, Nova Scotia Municipal Board, 
1985 
H. Archibald Kaiser 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
H. Archibald Kaiser, “Riverlake Residents Association, Nova Scotia Municipal Board, 1985”, Comment, 
(1984-1985) 9:3 DLJ 811. 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
H. Archibald Kaiser* Riverlake Residents
Association, Nova Scotia
Municipal Board, 1985
Administrative tribunals seem to go about their business in a
manner which does not command much attention outside the
coterie of specialists who work in the area. This seems a great
pity, as the matters with which such forums deal are often of
significance to the public at large. Occasionally a decision will
command a broader audience and the public may then see the
implications of what goes on behind doors which are only
nominally open to all. Riverlake Residents Association' is one
decision which has, in its short life, enjoyed intense public
scrutiny. 2 The results of this attention are not yet manifest,
but this commentator trusts that some of the less salutary
aspects of the case will be authoritatively and promptly
addressed by the courts, the Legislature or the Nova Scotia
Municipal Board itself.
The modest factual setting of Riverlake was not such as to
augur for the setting of a major precedent. It simply concerned
an appeal by a well-established residents association (about 10
years old, with a formal constitution, incorporated under the
Societies Act, with a record of interest in planning problems,
and supported by an area rate on real property assessments)
against the decision of Halifax County Council to permit
rezoning of a property. The Respondent, PROCOR, had owned
the land in question and carried on similar business activities
*Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. The case is more formally styled In the Matter Of. An Appeal by Riverlake
Residents Association. The decision, as yet unreported, was handed down
on April 30, 1985, by Ms. Elizabeth Lawrence, Vice-Chair of the Nova Scotia
Municipal Board, sitting as the sole Board member. As of the time of writing,
early August 1985, it has not been the subject of judicial review, appeal or
subsequent comment by the Board itself. Page numbers herein refer to the
actual decision of the Board.
2. For example, the Community Planning Association of Canada, Nova Scotia
Division, has established a working group dealing with the "aggrieved persons"
formulation established in Riverlake. Further, the matter was raised in Oral
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on its holdings for about 25 years. Its land had been previously
unzoned and the Council decision altered its status to General
Industrial (I-1), in effect making its use legal and conforming.
However, prior to the Board considering the appeal on the
merits, the Respondent raised an objection to the status of the
Appellant, Riverlake Assistants Association, and hence to the
jurisdiction of the Board to hear the appeal.
Since 63(1) of the Planning Act 3 states:
The amendment, revision or refusal by a council to amend
or revise the land-use by-law may be appealed by
(a) an aggrieved person;
(b) the applicant;
(c) the Director;
(d) the council of an adjoining municipality.
(Emphasis added)
Prior to June 1, 1983, the Planning Act, Ch. 16, R.S.N.S.
1969, as amended, had contained somewhat different wording
on entitlement to appeal.
Section 38(4) had stated:
An interested person, the Director or the council of any
other municipality may within thirty days of the publishing
of the notice under sub-section (3) appeal to the Board....
(Emphasis added)
The Board construed the change of criteria for an Appellant
to express ". .. an intention to restrict to some degree those
who have the right to appeal. . .4" The Board then formulated
the issue: ". . . the degree to which the term 'aggrieved person'
is more restrictive than the term 'interested person' and whether
or not the Association meets this test."
Questions Put by Members, in the May 15, 1985 sitting of the Nova Scotia
House of Assembly (pp. 2260-61 of the Debates and Proceedings of the House,
Edition 85-48). The Minister of Municipal Affairs, The Honourable Thomas
Mclnnis replied, in part:
So, what we tried to do was to narrow it, and I recall the debate
at length that took place in Law Amendments. At no time did we
intend that the definition be so narrow as to exclude groups such as,
for example, those vying to hold on to the Hart House or the Friends
of the Public Gardens, for example.It was not the intention to exclude
people like that. It was not the intention to exclude the group that
obviously now have been excluded under this decision by the "Municipal
Board". (at p. 2260)
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The Nova Scotia Municipal Board concluded that the new
legislative language had to be interpreted to be far more
confining than the predecssor section. It decided that Riverlake
had not proven its standing as an aggrieved person and
dismissed the appeal. It adopted a standard which is apparently
an amalgam of what were in the Board's own words "the two
most restrictive definitions of 'aggrieved person'
6"
In the opionion of the Board, the Appellant does not have
a legal grievance in this matter, it has not been denied some
personal or property right or had imposed upon it a burden
or obligation and therefore is not an 'aggrieved person' in
the matter of this hearing.
7
The Board would seem to have been acurate in its statement
of the issue, but its reasoning and conclusion are somewhat
doubtful. Interpretation of legislative intention, particularly
without the aid of statutory definition as one sees here, is seldom
an easy task. Nonetheless, this acknowledgement of the difficulty
of the enterprise is not meant to excuse the employment of
less reliable techniques of intrpretation. In the common law,
precedents are most deserving of respect in future curial
considerations if they not only emerge from authoritative rungs
in the judicial hierarchy but also bring the best methodology
to bear to the process of arriving at a decision. Riverlake, by
its choice and use of authority, emerges as a decision which
is too formalistic and detached from its context.
Well, of course the obvious thing that could be done would be, the
best solution of course would be an amendment to the Act. As I say,
staff and the legal section of my department are reviewing the decision...
As I say, groups such as that of course would not in most instances
have property and indeed, individuals in many instances are unable,
if they are injuriously affected to proceed because of cost and so on.
Therefore, they are always aided, in most instances at least, by a group
or an association of some sort to help the body and to fight the cause.
It is unfortunate, but however that was the decision and perhaps it
will be overturned in a higher court. (at 2261)
3. S.N.S., 1983, Chapter 9.
4. Supra, footnote 1, at 28.
5. Id.
6. Id., p. 29.
7. Id., p. 31.
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The principal precedents relied upon by the Board are Ex
Parte Sidebotham8 and Halifax Atlantic Investments Ltd., et
al v. Durham Leasehold Ltd.9 In the author's view, neither
are authorities which ought to have been determinative of the
issues before the tribunal. In Sidebotham, the Court of Appeal
was, in 1880, called upon to decide whether an undischarged
bankrupt was a "person aggrieved" who could therefore appeal
a refusal by a County Court judge to consider the bankrupt's
application for review of a trustee's actions. The Comptroller
in Bankruptcy alone was decided to be a "person aggrieved"
within the legislation. It is submitted that this case should have
been examined with greater skepticism by the Municipal Board
to the extent that reliance should not have been placed upon
it. First, it comes from an era of judicial antipathy to statute
law. As Professor Frank Grad has observed, albeit mainly based
on American observations:
... [J]udicial hostility to legislation around the end of the
nineteenth century had reached outrageous proportions.'0
Second, the case deals with a wholly different subject and
statutory environment, where the Court may have had much
better reasons for reducing the ambit of "aggrieved person".
Similarly, Halifax Atlantic Investments would be of dubious
persuasive weight. It involved an attempt by members of the
Halifax Hotel Association to oppose a lot consolidation by
a would-be rival hotel owner. More than anything else, it was
"... truly a contest based on potential competition,'''' in the
view of Coffin, J.A. The Riverlake Residents Association was,
if anything, trying to protect what it deemed to be the interests
of the community at large, not a narrow profit-oriented segment
of society, as one sees in Halifax Atlantic Investments.
8. [1880] C.D. 459 (C.A.).
9. 28 N.S.R. (2d) 193 (1978, N.S.S.C., A.D.).
10. Frank P. Grad, The Ascendancy of Legislation: Legal Problem-Solving
in Our Time, (1985), 9 Dalhousie Law Journal 228-260, at 229.
1I. Supra, footnote 9, at p. 212.
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Neither should the resort to Black's Law Dictionary2 be
applauded in the common law context in Canada. Not to put
too fine a point on it, it is an American reference tool. Its
definitions usually are derived from cases, as appears here for
"aggrieved party" in the Revised Fourth Edition (1968). By the
Fifth Edition (1979), the case references have been excised,
although the definition is exactly the same. The cases themselves,
the sources of Black's pronouncements, surely offer firmer
guidance, if they survive the test of a close inspection. The
author respectfully suggests that works such as Black's are most
effectively and acceptably used to orient a legal researcher at
the commencement of an exercise in interpretation, not to
resolve difficult problems in the search for legislative meaning.
This reluctance in Riverlake to examine the context of the
above decisions contrasts rather sharply with the Board's
readiness to reject the cases cited by Riverlake in support of
its contention that there has been a trend toward the
liberalization of standing requirements. The Board refused to
follow, for example, Vladicka,'3 Stein, 14 or Brodie, 15 and other
similar precedents because they ". . . are supportive only ofthe
rights of Appellants to be considered 'aggrieved persons' where
the issues are constitutional or where prerogative remedies are
sought". 16 Although the Board justified this position on the
basis of its task in Riverlake being more limited, the Association
having ". . . to establish its standing as an Appelant pursuant
to the statutory right of appeal set out in the Planning Act", 17
this chore of legislative interpretation would have been assisted
by the consideration of such cases as the Appellants offerred.
To dismiss them as being irrelevant in any administrative law
context would be extremely difficult to justify.In planning law,
the choice to exclude such authorities seems even more
unsuitable.
12. Supra, footnote 1, at p. 29. No reference to the edition used was made
by the Board.
13. [1974] 4 W.W.R. 159 (Alta. S.C.).
14. (1974), 48 D.I.R. (3d) 223 (Man. C.A.).
15. (1975), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 380 (N.S.S.C., A.D.).
16. Supra, footnote 1, at p. 16.
17. Id., at 18.
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The purposes of the Planning Act are set forth in its Section
2, especially subsections (c) and (d):
(c) establish a consultative process which will ensure the
right of the public to have access to information and
participate in the formulation of policies, regulations,
strategies and by-laws, including the right to be notified and
heard before decisions are made under this act; and
(d) provide for the fair, reasonable and efficient admin-
istration of this Act, in order that sound development may
be encouraged. 1983, c.9, s.2.
The Board concluded that sub-section (c) related "primarily
to public participation in the preparation and approval of
Municipal Planning Strategies and Land-Use By-Laws..."18
The "right to be notified and heard before decisions are made
under this Act" was construed as referring to the "policy,
regulation, strategy and by-law development and approval
process only, or may by extension be intended to apply to other
'decisions under this Act', e.g. the approval or refusal by a
Council to approve amendments to a Land-Use By-Law".19 The
Board concluded that:
"Public participation in all phases of the planning process",
(Counsel's words) does not extend to an unrestricted right
of appeal for each and every citizen, in either this Planning
Act or its predecessor.
20
With respect, this is an extremely narrow reading of subsection
(c).Even if it did not settle the meaning of "aggrieved person",
this subsection and the one following ought to have caused
the Board to adopt a less closed interpretation. The Board's
outlook does not seem consonant with either the Planning Act
or the spirit which should infuse an area of law where citizen
participation is of such pivotal importance. Subsection (d) which
should also colour one's interpretation of section 63(1) was not
mentioned at all. One can readily envisage "aggrieved person"
being defined less restrictively while still preserving the elusive
intention of the Legislature, a perspective which is supported
18. Id., at 23.
19. Id.
20. Id., at 24.
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by the statements of purpose contained in these two subsections
of the Act. This commentator argues that in this instance of
there being two or more possible interpretations of the
legislation, these portions of the Planning Act should cause
the more liberal view to be adopted.
Planning law provides the framework wherein benefits are
allocated among the various interests who compete for the
financial and other non-quantifiable prizes inherent in land use.
2'
Section 63(5) (or Section 71(5)) of the Planning Act ensures
that local governments will be accorded the primary respon-
sibility for decision-making in planning matters and that the
Board will not lightly substitute its judgment for one made
by municipal political organs:
The Board shall not allow the Appeal unless the Board
determines that the decision of the council cannot reasonably
be said to carry out the intent of the municipal planning
strategy.
There is, therefore, no real risk of the Municipal Board usurping
the powers of civic governments. Merely adopting a less vigilant
attitude at the portals of the Board would not change the very
onerous burdens placed upon appellants. It is impossible to
say with certainty what would have happened here had Riverlake
been qualified as an Appellant. However, the Board having
made some comments in the decision which could also be
relevant to the merits, it is a fair prediction that Riverlake would
have failed in its efforts to overturn the decision of Council
with Section 63(5) in mind. This may have been quite
appropriate, but at least Riverlake would have had the
opportunity to present its full case.
Another result could have been produced by the use of less
restrictive authorities than were finally relied upon in Riverlake.
Alternatively, the tribunal may have chosen to invoke
presumptions which may assist in determining the meaning of
the legislature where there is doubt concerning a particular
passage. Although presumptions ought not to be utilized where
the effect would be to do violence to the clear words of the
21. Stanley M. Makuch, in his recent book Canadian Municipal and Planning
Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1983), presents a coherent explanation of the various
interests at stake in the overall planning process, notably in Chapter 5(2)
The Nature of Planning, from which this observation is principally drawn.
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legislature, this would not have been the result here. Maxwell
on the Interpretation of Statutes suggests the direction that
such presumptions would have yielded in Riverlake:
In determining either the general object of the legislature,
or the meaning of its language in any particular passage,
it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most
in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles
should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed
to be the true one.
22
Why was another arguable conception of the meaning of
"aggrieved person" not selected in Riverlake? This is a
challenging question, but one perhaps too speculative for this
Comment. Eminently respectable common law authorities and
techniques of reasoning were available to elucidate this
troublesome phrase in a manner more favourable to Riverlake
and other appellants.They just were not used. Of course, even
the precise methodology and use of authorities as advocated
herein would not have guaranteed a less restrictive outcome.
Most decisions on similar cases are not ultimately based on
precedent and reasoning, so much as on the complex of values
held by the tribunal. It is this level of analysis which is beyond
the scope of this note.
On the other hand, it is fair to observe that the interests
of citizen's groups like the Riverlake Residents Association are
not advanced by this case. The implications of Riverlake are
thereby more disturbing than one might first suspect. Citizens
who individually or in association appeal planning decisions
are not likely to embark upon such a course of action frivolously.
It is suggested that, more often than not, they are people who
have a sincere and thoughtful long-term outlook on the best
interests of their community. The barriers erected by Riverlake
will undoubtedly discourage many bona fides appellants, to the
detriment of the broader society. Effectively, appellants are
forced to overcome these looming standing obstacles before
presenting the merits of their case. Lord Diplock, in a different
context but with the same principle in mind as this commentator
22. P. St.J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, (12th ed.
London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1969) at 199.
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wishes to convey, observed in Inland Revenue Commissioners
v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses
Ltd.:
To revert to technical restrictions on locus stand to prevent
this that were correct thirty years ago or more would be
to reverse that progress towards a comprehensive system of
administrative law that I regard as having been the greatest
achievement of the English courts in my judicial lifetime.
23
There are many ways by which the more unfortunate aspects
of Riverlake may be overcome. It may still be the subject of
judicial review, as the time limit does not expire until about
the end of October, 1985 (Civil Procedure Rule 56.06). In the
alternative, a subsequent decision in the same genre may be
appealed or the Municipal Board itself may decide, with due
deference to stare decisis, to moderate the Riverlake notion
of "aggrieved persons" in a future case. Finally, the legislature
may fill in the lacunae in the 1983 amendment. At bottom,
Riverlake deserves to be a short-lived precedent. Should it stand
intact in the longer term, it ought to be subject to further and
more intensive attention by academic and practising lawyers,
the press and the general public. It is hoped that such scrutiny
will at least mitigate its effects.
23. [1981] 2 All E.R. 93 (H.L.), at p. 104. The case concerned an application
for judicial review of the Revenue decision to grant a form of amnesty to
a group of Fleet Street casual employees who had not been paying tax.
